

# **Maryland Public School Critical Life-Threatening Incident After-Action Summary Report**

*This report details lessons learned and recommendations from the local review of a critical life-threatening incident, aimed at enhancing the safety of Maryland public schools.*

**MARYLAND CENTER for SCHOOL SAFETY**

Education Article § 7-1502(g)(21)

Education Article § 7-1510(g)

COMAR 14.40.05.04

**School Year: 2025-2026**

**Submitted: June 26, 2026**

# MARYLAND CENTER for SCHOOL SAFETY

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June 26, 2026

The Honorable Wes Moore  
Governor  
100 State Circle  
Annapolis, MD 21401

The Honorable William C. Ferguson IV  
President  
Senate of Maryland  
State House, H-107  
Annapolis, MD 21401

The Honorable Joseline A. Pena-Melnyk  
Speaker  
House of Delegates  
State House, H-101  
Annapolis, MD 21401

Re: Critical Life Threatening Incident Report required by Education Article § 7-1502(g)(21) (MSAR #11851), Education Article § 7-1510(g) (MSAR #11594), and COMAR 14.40.05.04 (MSAR #15583).

Dear Governor Moore, President Ferguson, and Speaker Pena-Melnyk:

Pursuant to Education Article § 7-1502(g)(21), Education Article § 7-1510(g), and State Government Article § 2-1257, and COMAR 14.40.05.04, the Maryland Center for School Safety (MCSS) respectfully submits the following report, which contains identified lessons learned and school safety recommendations following a critical life-threatening incident on public school grounds.

If you have any questions about this report or would like additional information, please contact Joseph Dino Pignataro at [joseph.pignataro@maryland.gov](mailto:joseph.pignataro@maryland.gov) or 410-281-2335.

Sincerely,



Kate Bryan  
Executive Director



## Maryland Public School Critical Life-Threatening Incident After-Action Summary

On March 27, 2026, an incident occurred at a school within the Allegany County Public Schools (ACPS) system that met the criteria for a critical life-threatening incident pursuant to Md. Code Ann., Educ. § 7-1510(g) and COMAR 14.40.05.

### **Notification** [COMAR 14.40.05.04A]

On March 27, 2026, ACPS staff notified the Maryland Center for School Safety (MCSS) of the incident.

### **After-Action Meeting** [COMAR 14.40.05.04B]

On April 17, 2026, an after-action meeting was held with school representatives, law enforcement, and MCSS representatives.

### **After-Action Report** [COMAR 14.40.05.04C]

On May 4, 2026, ACPS submitted an after-action report to MCSS.

### **Lessons Learned**

Based upon the after-action review led by the ACPS, the following lessons learned were identified:

1. Operational coordination between law enforcement search teams and school leadership was hindered by incompatible radio systems. To prevent critical communication delays during building clearance, responding officers should be equipped with school compatible radio frequencies or dedicated handheld units.
2. Utilizing a reunification site where the "I Love U Guys" Foundation Standard Reunification Method (SRM) training had previously occurred proved beneficial. The familiar environment prepared personnel for the facility's logistical requirements, validating the importance of regular emergency drills at designated locations.
3. The efficiency of the reunification process was substantially improved because school personnel reviewed an SRM instructional video upon arrival at the site. This just-in-time training served as a critical refresher that streamlined staff deployment and reduced administrative friction during the high-stress event.



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4. Disseminating the reunification site location to the media too early resulted in parents arriving before students, causing logistical congestion. Future crisis communication protocols should delay public notification of the exact location until students are on-site to ensure a controlled intake process.
5. Directly notifying the School Resource Officer (SRO) instead of using primary emergency channels bypassed the 9-1-1 system, resulting in an incomplete initial dispatch. School safety protocols must emphasize that all critical incidents require an immediate 9-1-1 call to ensure centralized coordination, regardless of on-site security presence.
6. Utilizing a live, collaborative online document for attendance proved highly effective for tracking students during the chaotic arrival window. This real-time cloud solution allowed administrators to bypass cumbersome paper rosters and compile an accurate, rapid headcount that could be monitored simultaneously by command personnel.

## **School Safety Recommendations**

1. Uniformed law enforcement should be stationed at reunification sites prior to the arrival of families to manage traffic, organize parent queues, and provide a reassuring presence.
2. Local Education Agencies (LEAs) should prioritize reunification sites where reunification training has previously occurred to maximize staff familiarity with the physical layout and operational flow.
3. School safety plans should incorporate live, collaborative digital documents for student accountability, particularly for incidents occurring during transitions when traditional rosters may be incomplete.
4. A unified command post—consisting of school administration, central office personnel, and law enforcement leadership—should be established immediately on-site to facilitate synchronized decision-making.
5. School systems should implement protocols to ensure that classroom master keys are immediately accessible to responding law enforcement search teams to prevent delays during building clearance.

